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Three Reforming Regimes?: Modernity and the Fiscal State in Modern 
Korean History 
 
Holly Stephens 
Introduction 
 
For several years, questions of modernity and the emergence of modern Korea have driven a 
considerable body of research into modern Korean history. To some extent this is to be 
expected—what else should historians of modern Korea study if not Korea’s experience of the 
modern era, after all? This trend has not been without benefit, and the examination of Korean 
modernity has inspired numerous insights into new forms of government administration, 
evolving gender roles, literary production, religious practice, and the modernity embedded in 
new styles of urbanization, consumption, and medicine, to highlight just a few topics.1 Yet, as 
several scholars have noted, insofar as modernity and the modern nature of Korean society have 
been adopted as normative concepts—generally used to refer to some combination of the rise of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Kyung Moon Hwang, Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1894-1945 (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2016); Theodore Jun Yoo, The Politics of Gender in Colonial Korea: Education, 
Labor, and Health, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Hyaeweol Choi, Gender and 
Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Nayoung 
Aimee Kwon, Intimate Empire: Collaboration and Colonial Modernity in Korea and Japan (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015); Albert L. Park, Building a Heaven on Earth: Religion, Activism, and Protest in Japanese-
occupied Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014); Jin Y. Park, ed., Makers of Modern Korean 
Buddhism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010); Todd A. Henry, Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule 
and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); 
Laurel Kendall, ed., Consuming Korean Tradition in Early and Late Modernity: Commodification, Tourism, and 
Performance (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011); Theodore Jun Yoo, It’s Madness: The Politics of 
Mental Health in Colonial Korea (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).  
For reasons of space, I refer here only to works published in English within the last decade. This list is not intended 
to be exhaustive, nor should it be implied that this trend is limited to English-language scholarship. Indeed, the 
concepts of modernity and colonial modernity have proven similarly stimulating among Korean-language 
scholarship as well. For an overview of some of the discussion of modernity within South Korean scholarship, see 
Yun Haedong et al., eds., Kŭndae rŭl tasi ingnŭnda (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 2006), 30-148; Younghan Cho, 
“Colonial Modernity Matters? Debates on Colonial Past in South Korea,” Cultural Studies 26, no. 5 (2012): 645-
669. 
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capitalism, nationalism, secularization, westernization, urbanization, and/or industrialization—
the collective focus on modernity has arguably limited the scope of historical inquiry to topics 
that fit within chosen definitions of modernity.2 Nonetheless, modernity continues to feature 
heavily even amid corrective accounts, as scholars have sought to expand either the temporal 
range of Korean modernity or its scope, either searching for earlier modern origins or broadening 
the discussion of modernity to include previously overlooked topics such as religion or 
reimagined agrarian traditions.3 While these efforts raise an important challenge to overly rigid 
interpretations of modernity, ultimately they do little to overturn the centrality of the 
modernization paradigm in historical analysis of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in Korea.  
Standard periodizations only compound the definitional problem of what counts as 
modern in Korean history. Too easily, the Chosŏn period is conflated with early modern 
traditions while Korean modernity appears as a break from the past, be it through the opening of 
ports to new patterns of diplomacy and trade, various attempts to reform the structure of the 
government in the 1880s and 1890s, or annexation by Japan. Even among explicit attempts to 
describe Chosŏn-era sprouts of economic change and modernization, the impact of western 
influences and colonization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is characterized as 
a break from what might have been, once again dividing Korea’s experience of modernity from 
what came before.  
                                                 
2 For critical interpretations of modernity in the recent historiography, see John B. Duncan, “The Confucian Context 
of Reform,” in Kim Dong-no, John B. Duncan, and Kim Do-hyung, eds., Reform and Modernity in the Taehan 
Empire (Seoul: Jimoondang, 2006), 105-125; Park, Building Heaven on Earth, 4-9; Andrew Hall and Leighanne 
Yuh, “History of Education and Language in late Chosŏn and Colonial Era Korea: Guest Editors’ Introduction,” 
Acta Koreana 18, no. 2 (2015): 321-325; James B. Lewis, “Korea by 1860,” in Michael Seth, ed., Routledge 
Handbook of Modern Korean History (New York: Routledge, 2016), 15, 16. 
3 Kim, Duncan, and Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity; Park, Building a Heaven on Earth; Gi-Wook Shin, 
“Agrarianism: A Critique of Colonial Modernity in Korea,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 4 
(1999): 784-804. 
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This paper presents an alternative conception of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
one that explicitly aims to look beyond the category of “the modern” in order to bridge to the 
historiographical divide of late Chosŏn and colonial Korea. Of course, there is no denying that 
Korean ports did open in new ways after 1876, and that the government did take on new forms 
and roles, whether through domestic reforms or under Japanese colonial rule. Nonetheless, rather 
than treating these events as moments of modern origin this essay will consider government 
reforms within a longer perspective that attempts to account for the continuities that bridged 
1876 and 1910. As part of the wider project of “Bridging Korea, Old and New,” this paper 
provides a framework to bring modern Korea into discussion and direct comparison with the 
history of earlier periods in order to spark fresh insights into both new and old. 
In particular, I trace the development of institutions surrounding taxation through the 
nineteenth century until the end of colonial rule. While accounting for the changes to the tax 
system from one government to the next, I argue that the development of taxation was not the 
product of an overarching state rationality but depended upon the ability of the state to access 
information and negotiate among competing interests in accordance with the pre-existing social 
and economic context. Both access to information and the process of negotiation required tax 
institutions to develop in relation to existing practices, notably the practices of brokerage as 
explored in the previous article by John S. Lee; the administrative infrastructure of the state, 
local government, and non- or semi-governmental organizations; and the inherent limits of a 
central government budget. Viewed in this way, the evolution of taxation in Korea is more than 
the realization of a modern ideal—it defined interactions between the population and 
government, appealing to a wide array of norms as different governments confronted shared 
fiscal concerns.  
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Beyond Modernity in Korean History 
 
Though not always couched in the language of modernity, the specter of “modern” development 
has long informed the historiography of Korea. Where some of the earliest colonial narratives 
denied the possibility of independent Korean modernization, later proponents of internal 
development theory explicitly emphasized what they saw as the sprouts of modern, capitalist 
development within the Chosŏn period.4 Meanwhile, in taking modernization as a proxy for the 
ability to maintain national independence, numerous accounts of the open-ports period debated 
the internal and external contributions to and detractions from a range of modernizing projects, 
from the Kabo Reforms, to the Independence Club, to the role of foreign advisors to the Korean 
government.5 Similarly, some of the earliest histories of the colonial period assessed Japanese 
colonial rule along a spectrum of exploitation and modernization, measuring the costs and 
benefits of the colonial legacy for either Korea or Japan. Linking all three debates is an 
underlying valorization of modernization, tied to the fate of the nation-state, as a feature of 
universal historical progress.  
The adoption of modernity within historical analysis thus proved a valuable tool for 
scholars looking to question how Japanese imperial rule and the adoption of new forms of 
knowledge, technology, and culture mutually informed one another within the asymmetries of 
                                                 
4 For a concise overview of modernization and internal development historiography, see Yun Haedong, Kŭndae 
yŏksahak ŭi hwanghon (Seoul: Ch’aek kwa hamgge, 2010), 36-67. 
5 For a summary of the reform and modernization projects of the open ports period and their subsequent analysis, 
see Kim Do-hyung, “Introduction: The Nature of Reform in the Taehan Empire,” in Kim, Duncan, and Kim, eds., 
Reform and Modernity, 1-34; Joshua Van Lieu, “The Nation, the People, and the Possibilities of the Post-National: 
Historiographies of Late-Nineteenth-Century Korean Reform Movements,” in Seth, ed., Routledge Handbook, 43-
61. 
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colonial society. In contrast to earlier, mostly positive discussions of colonial modernization, Gi-
Wook Shin and Michael Robinson’s critical articulation of colonial modernity highlighted the 
ambiguity of “modern” developments during the colonial-era, be it through a legal code that 
simultaneously protected rights in one realm while denying them in another, or through new 
technologies that enhanced the scope of colonial rule even as they opened new cultural and 
economic avenues for some Koreans.6 Numerous studies of modernity followed, at their best 
probing the tensions and processes that underpinned the formation and reevaluation of 
knowledge and cultural norms in colonial Korea, providing an important critique to the 
supposedly universal nature of modernity itself.7 Arguments over the usage of colonial 
modernity have only further entrenched the concept within historiographies. Notably, scholars 
affiliated with the Naksŏngdae Economic Research Institute have come under criticism for 
reviving positive assessments of colonial modernization,8 while others have rejected the entire 
concept of colonial modernity, conflating its different interpretations as uniformly crediting the 
Japanese colonial rule for any modernization that occurred in Korea.9 
In recent years a number of works have attempted to address these concerns, pushing 
back the boundary of modernity in Korean history to incorporate the Great Korean Empire 
period (1897-1910) and other late-Chosŏn reform movements. As Kyung Moon Hwang 
                                                 
6 Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, “Introduction: Rethinking Colonial Korea,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael 
Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 1-18. 
7 See, for example, Jung Lee, “Mutual Transformation of Colonial and Imperial Botanizing? The Intimate Yet 
Remote Collaboration in Colonial Korea,” Science in Context 29, no. 2 (2016): 179-211. Although Lee does not 
make explicit reference to colonial modernity, her article shares many of the same concerns articulated by Shin and 
Robinson. 
8 Owen Miller, “The Idea of Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right,” Korean 
Histories 2, no. 1 (2010): 3-12. 
9 See, for example, Hong Yung Lee, “Introduction: A Critique of ‘Colonial Modernity,’” in Lee, Ha and Sorenson, 
eds., Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 12. 
This interpretation, it should be noted, is at odds with many of the ways that historians have utilized the concept of 
colonial modernity.  
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describes in the introduction to his study of modern state-making: “many of the major measures 
that are now commonly recognized as core projects of the colonial state—household registration 
reform, land reform, infrastructural projects, disease control measures, etc.—had forerunners in 
the precolonial and pre-protectorate period, and in fact state makers throughout this era drew 
largely from the same models of modern statecraft circulating around the globe.”10 No longer 
taking the colonial state as the progenitor of modern reform, Hwang thus brings colonial 
economic, education, and social policies into explicit conversation with similar projects 
beginning in the 1890s. 
 Once again, studies such as these have contributed much to our understanding of late 
nineteenth century Korea. While previous scholarship focused on Korea’s supposed failure to 
modernize, reading a fatalistic gloss over early attempts to popularize ideas of liberal democracy 
or to enact financial and political reform, new research highlights instead the vibrancy and 
variety of late nineteenth century reform projects while reinstating Korean agency within 
modernization attempts. In this vein, scholars have convincingly argued that precolonial reform 
projects were at minimum a meaningful intervention in modern Korean history, if not a basis for 
later formulations of modern nationalism, statecraft, and education, among others.11 
 Nonetheless, insofar as the goal of much of this research has remained focused on 
questions of modernity, the scope of the scholarship has arguably remained limited. As Albert 
Park aptly notes in the introduction to his study of colonial-era religious activism, “studies of 
colonial modernity have configured modernity only as a linear form of development that 
                                                 
10 Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 10, 11. For other examinations of pre-colonial modernity, see also Kim, Duncan, 
and Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity.  
11 Kim Do-hyung, “Introduction: The Nature of Reform in the Taehan Empire,” 1-34; Hwang, Rationalizing Korea; 
Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Leighanne Yuh, 
“Moral Education, Modernization Imperatives, and the People’s Elementary Reader (1895): Accommodation in the 
Early History of Modern Education in Korea,” Acta Koreana 18, no. 2 (2015): 327-355. 
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emphasizes the secular, bourgeois/proletariat, urban spaces and industrial capitalism.”12 In this 
regard, studies that attempt to find the pre-colonial origins of modernity in Korea share a similar 
focus on the development of print media, industrial reforms, the introduction of electricity, 
western-style education and other “modern” innovations. Park himself confronts the limitation of 
modernity-centered scholarship by expanding the definition of modernity to include rural and 
religious movements, however this approach can only go so far before running into new, albeit 
broader, limits of the definition of modernity or diluting the analytical value of modernity 
entirely.13  
Several publications have highlighted the potential for research into the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to move beyond a focus on modernity. As explored by Kyung Moon Hwang, 
long-held Confucian concepts continued to inform enlightenment reformers’ ideas about the 
nature of the state (kukka) even as intellectuals debated new theories emerging from Japan, 
China, Germany, and beyond.14 Yumi Moon’s research into the Ilchinhoe—a populist group 
famous for their anti-monarch stance and collaboration with imperial Japan—shows in great 
detail how long-standing local grievances informed popular reactions to governmental reforms in 
the 1890s and 1900s.15 And several studies on late-Chosŏn foreign relations have re-examined 
the persistence of the Chosŏn-Qing tribute relationship, not as a traditional contrast to later 
“modern” diplomacy but as significant within its own terms, even as those terms were changing 
in the context of the nineteenth century.16 In each case, the modernity of reforms—be they in 
                                                 
12 Park, Building a Heaven on Earth, 14. 
13 Ibid., 14, 15. On the problems of modernity as an analytical device, see also Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in 
Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 113-149. 
14 Kyung Moon Hwang, “Country or State? Reconceptualizing Kukka in the Korean Enlightenment Period, 1896–
1910,” Korean Studies 24 (2000): 1-24. 
15 Yumi Moon, Populist Collaborators: The Ilchinhoe and the Japanese Colonization of Korea, 1896-1910 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2013). 
16 Hara Takemichi, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians: Diplomacy in Early Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 
Modern Asian Studies 32, No. 2 (1998): 389-430; Kirk Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism 
8 
 
changing taxation and land rights, or the introduction of the telegraph and new forms of treaty 
commerce under Qing imperialism—did not necessarily define their impact on Korean society; 
instead, previous ideas and conflicts about tax collection, or the status of Chosŏn’s relationship 
to Qing imperialism, shaped responses to modernizing reforms just as much, if not more so, than 
did questions about the modern nature of the reforms themselves. While it is futile to dispute the 
growing influence of “modern” changes in the late-nineteenth century, it is also necessary to 
acknowledge the continuity of “non-modern” aspects as well.   
 These exceptions highlight the risks of limiting historical research to the exploration of 
the modern attributes of Korean society, through the elision and marginalization of significant 
research topics. While studies of the introduction of modern finance favor research into the 
development of the colonial banking system and the spread of financial associations (Ko. 
kŭmyung chohap; Ja. kin’yū kumiai), this perspective overlooks the continuation of local 
community lending through kye organizations or the resurrection of seasonal grain loans 
(sahwan), albeit in a different form, in the 1930s.17 Research into the modern development of 
commerce and urban consumption likewise often fails to account for the persistence of periodic 
markets and their significant role within the rural economy.18 Meanwhile, studies of the colonial 
police and the emergence of a modern governmentality must also account for the persistent role 
                                                 
and Chosŏn Korea, 1850–1910 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008); Joshua Van Lieu, “The 
Politics of Condolence: Contested Representations of Tribute in Late Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn-Qing Relations,” 
Journal of Korean Studies 14, no. 1 (2009): 83-115; Joshua Van Lieu, “Chosŏn-Qing Tributary Discourse: 
Transgression, Restoration, and Textual Performativity,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 27 
(2018): 79-112. 
17 Among the few studies of kye lending in the colonial period, see Kim Chaeho, “Nongch’on sahoe ŭi sinyong kwa 
kye: 1853-1934,” in An Pyŏngjik and Yi Yŏnghun, eds., Matjil ŭi nongmindŭl: Han’guk kŭnse ch’ollak 
saenghwalsa (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2001); Hong Sŏngch’an, “1920 nyŏndae ŭi nongch’on chŏch’uk chohap yŏn’gu: 
Chŏnnam Posŏng-gun Tŭngnyang-myŏn ‘Songgok chŏch’uk chohap’ ŭi unyŏng sarye,” Tongbang hakchi 137 
(2007): 111-149. Hong’s article in particular stands out for analyzing community lending in relation to 
contemporary changes in the broader financial system. 
18 On rural markets, see Hŏ Yŏngnan, Ilche sigi changsi yŏn’gu (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 2009); Hur Young-ran 
(Hŏ Yŏngnan), “Colonial Modernity and Rural Markets During the Japanese Colonial Period,” International 
Journal of Korean History 15, no. 2 (2010): 69-96. 
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of local elites and appeals to Confucian ethics in village-level politics.19 Where studies of 
modernity have been criticized for emphasizing an urban and elite culture that remained out of 
reach for much of the population,20 research into topics that fall outside of the standard definition 
of modernity is a necessary counterpart to provide a balanced understanding of the boundaries 
and limitations of modern developments themselves—all the more so for research into the 
colonial period if historians are to avoid take the modernizing claims of the colonial government 
at face value. 
   
Reperiodization and the Nineteenth Century in Modern Korean History 
 
It is against this modernity-centered historiography that reperiodization presents an opportunity. 
Instead of drawing the boundaries of modern history according to a value-laden definition of 
what counts as “modern,” this article proposes to explicitly include a holistic view of the 
nineteenth century within analysis of “modern Korea.” This is not to search for ever earlier 
origins of “modern Korea,” but rather to frame discussion of the modern within a broader 
perspective. Increased attention to the nineteenth century and its legacies, modern or not, 
prompts a reckoning with alternative historical questions that can both increase knowledge of the 
nineteenth century itself and help to create new historical narratives capable of bridging the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 The problem of periodizing the modern era is not limited to Korean history. Indeed, the 
adoption of colonial modernity within Korean history itself grew out of wider discussions of 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Chi Sugŏl, “Ilcheha Ch’ungnam Sŏsan-gun ŭi ‘kwarryo-yuji chibae ch’eje’: ‘Sŏsan gunji’ 
(1927) e taehan punsŏk ŭl chungsim ŭro,” Yŏksa munje yŏn’gu 3 (1999): 13-75. 
20 On this argument, see Chan Seung Park, “Japanese Rule and Colonial Dual Society,” Korea Journal 50, no. 4 
(2010): 69-98.  
10 
 
colonial modernity and the problem of modernity in East Asia and beyond.21 Historians of India 
and colonial Africa likewise have grappled with the problem of how to frame modernity and the 
early modern period without reifying colonial ideas and institutions. While one response to the 
problem of modernity in history has been to challenge the definition of modernity and its related 
terminology (modernization, modernism, etc.),22 others have used reperiodization to provide an 
alternative perspective. Confronted with historiographical models that emphasize the division 
between early-modern and modern politics and society in Ottoman Egypt, Alan Mikhail 
proposes shifting the period of analysis to bridge the standard historiographical rupture. As he 
states: “Standing in the face of this purported separateness, the sources, histories, actors, 
processes, and ideas…plainly show this period to contain within it a great degree of continuity 
and connection across time.”23 Closer to Korea, Daniel Botsman’s study of penal reform in the 
early Meiji period explicitly begins with a thorough examination of Tokugawa-era punishment 
practices in order to counter teleological narratives of modernity and progress. Viewed in a 
longer perspective, the establishment of a “modern” prison system emerges less an objective 
example of progress, as much as part of a set of Japanese claims to international civilizational 
standards that in turn would be used to legitimize imperial rule in Taiwan and Korea.24 
 Several factors highlight the benefits of a longer view of the nineteenth century within 
accounts of modern Korea. For one thing, the nineteenth century witnessed shifts in several 
governmental and political norms, as well as the intensification of several social, economic, and 
                                                 
21 See, positions: east asia cultures critique 1 (1993); Tani E. Barlow, ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in 
East Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
22 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Muddle of the Modern,” American Historical Review 116, no. 3 (2011): 663-675; 
Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 113-149. 
23 Although Mikhail is challenging narratives that place 1800 as the turning point toward modern Egypt, his basic 
argument mirrors many of the problems identified in the Korean historiography. Alain Mikhail, The Animal in 
Ottoman Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 8. 
24 Daniel Botsman, Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005).  
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environmental problems that would occupy later reformers. This is by no means to say that 
Chosŏn Korea was on a path of inevitable decline throughout the nineteenth century; merely, that 
the politics and challenges of the nineteenth century are both distinctive from earlier periods and 
meaningful to later events. For example, following the reign of King Chŏngjo (1776—1800), 
royal authority passed to a series of kings whose young age and lack of experience provided 
fertile ground for the escalation of factional conflict and in-law politics, a pattern that continued 
even through to the reign of King Kojong (1864—1907). As far as royal in-laws and powerful 
lineages continued to influence Korean politics into the late nineteenth century, understanding 
their origin and evolution throughout the early half of the nineteenth century provides an 
important foundation against which to read later disputes. 
Despite the significance of the events of 1876, Japanese warships were not Korea’s first 
encounter with imperialism and Japan followed in the wake of English, French, Russian, and 
American incursions. Beyond direct encounters with foreign vessels, the Korean government 
was aware of the impact of western imperialism in China, knowledge of which helped to shape 
Korean responses to encroaching powers. Korea also experienced numerous rebellions and 
episodes of rural unrest through the nineteenth century that, though not directly connected to one 
another, nonetheless shared similar underlying factors, such as complaints over corruption 
among local government clerks, an increasing tax burden, the impact of expanding commerce, 
and problems in the state-managed grain loan system.25 Not only would these problems feature 
as the target of many of the government’s later reforms, but the politics surrounding these issues 
                                                 
25 Sun Joo Kim, Marginality and Subversion in Korea: the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion on 1812 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2007), 66-88; Sun Joo Kim, “Taxes, the Local Elite, and the Rural Populace in the Chinju 
Uprising of 1862,” Journal of Asian Studies 66, no. 4 (2007): 993-1027. This is not to claim that the causes of the 
two rebellions were identical. Indeed, Sun Joo Kim is careful to note the importance of regional discrimination as a 
factor behind the Hong Kyŏngnae rebellion in addition to more general economic pressures. 
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continued to shape popular responses to new government proposals. As with political and 
diplomatic reforms, so too did the introduction of new forms of medicine, education, and finance 
have to compete with existing knowledge and practices, making a fuller understanding of the 
nineteenth century essential to understanding even the most modern attributes of Korean history.  
 Full and thorough attention to the project of reperiodization goes beyond merely 
emphasizing the prior context to newly adopted practices. When examining the changes that are 
often taken to characterize “modern” Korea, the question of who participated in modern changes 
remains an important consideration. Too often, the influence of the modern developments at the 
heart of much research can be seen to be concentrated among the wealthy, the educated, and the 
urban population. And yet, the modernizing ideas that so inspired urban intellectuals in the 1880s 
and 1890s were not shared among all Koreans. Indeed, the demands of the Tonghak rebellion 
reveal a far more mundane series of concerns that align more closely to the long development of 
nineteenth century social problems than they do engagement with modern ideas of democracy 
and nationalism.26 Excessive focus on the modernity of intellectuals and government reform 
plans thus risks minimizing the experience of government for vast swathes of the population. 
Likewise, even if some women found new ways to challenge their social status through early 
contact with missionaries or the colonial education system, far more did not. Shifting the 
emphasis on what counts as modern in Korean history can thus be a powerful tool in writing 
overlooked voices into the historical record. To be fair, by virtue of their marginal status the 
                                                 
26 This need not negate arguments about the later development of Ch’ŏndogyo as a modern religious movement. 
Rather, that both the early background of Tonghak must also be considered alongside its subsequent development. 
George Kallander, Salvation through Dissent: Tonghak Heterodoxy and Early Modern Korea (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2013); Carl Young, Eastern Learning and the Heavenly Way: The Tonghak and Ch’ŏndogyo 
Movements and the Twilight of Korean Independence (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014). 
13 
 
voices of women and peasant farmers are not easy to uncover, but historians will definitely not 
find them if modernity is taken as the sole parameter for modern history.  
  
Taxation and Fiscal Regimes in Longer Perspective 
 
The remainder of this paper will focus on an attempt to put such reperiodization into practice 
through a study of taxation reform across three different fiscal regimes during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries: the existing late-Chosŏn model; the re-organization of the fiscal state 
during the Kabo Reforms and Great Korean Empire period; and that of the colonial period. 
While much of the following discussion covers events oft associated with narratives of 
modernity, the goal is not to contest existing knowledge as much as it is to place it within a 
longer frame that opens new opportunities for historical comparison.  
Taxation is a useful target of inquiry here, as it forms a basis for interaction between both 
central and local government offices, as well as between the government and the population at 
large—topics already examined in the previous papers. What is more, taxation and the 
management of state finance have long been treated as a source of government weakness in the 
late nineteenth century, and were a target of modernization projects under both Korean and 
colonial governments alike. According to typical accounts that emphasize the development of a 
modern fiscal system, this period saw the gradual development of state and bureaucratic 
capacities that supported the rationalization of state finances and enhanced central government 
control over financial resources, both increasing revenue collection through taxation and 
removing sources of corruption endemic to the Chosŏn tax system. Topics such as the cadastral 
surveys feature prominently in this view, symbolizing both the increased technical capacity of 
14 
 
the state and its exercise of a “modern sense of authority.”27 But, as I argue below, changes to 
taxation did not proceed smoothly along a continuum of modern rationality. A longer view of 
fiscal reform can thus be useful in highlighting recurrent challenges to the tax system as well as 
making clear the shifts in social relations engendered by tax reforms.  
In moving away from a classification of the modern or traditional features of rival tax 
systems, I draw on recent comparative research into fiscal regimes that seeks to expand 
conventional accounts of state finance by examining the social relations that underpinned pivotal 
changes to taxation. By viewing taxation in relation to social change, and not just as an index of 
the development of a modern state or a capitalist economy, this research highlights the wide 
variety of fiscal arrangements to which states have turned at different times, exposing the myth 
of a single European norm and highlighting the heterogeneity among different fiscal regimes.28 
Viewed comparatively, the new studies of fiscal regimes show no common progression toward a 
universal model of a (modern) fiscal state. War, and its associated costs, sometimes provided the 
impetus to enact financial reforms, but at other times did not; public debt, the hallmark of the 
progressive model of the fiscal state, sometimes enhanced states’ access to financial resources, 
                                                 
27 Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 45, 50, 51. For accounts that cite financial weakness as a causal factor in the failure 
of modernizing reforms and, by extension, the eventual colonization of Korea, see Kim Dong-no, “The Failure of 
State Reform Movements in Early Modern Korea and its Relevance to the Mobilization of Resources,” in Chang 
Yun-Shik, Donald L,. Baker, Hur Nam-lin, and Ross King, eds., Korea between Tradition and Modernity: Selected 
Papers from the Fourth Pacific and Asian Conference on Korean Studies (Vancouver: Institute of Asian Research, 
2000), 172-183; Kim Dong-no, “Views of Modern Reforms as Depicted in the Hwangsŏng sinmun during the 
Taehan Empire,” in Kim, Duncan, and Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity, 60-67. 
28 Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad, “The Thunder of History: The Origins and 
Development of the New Fiscal Sociology,” in Martin, Mehrotra and Prasad, eds., The New Fiscal Sociology: 
Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-27. The 
emergence of the New Fiscal Sociology coincides with a general revival of interest in the fiscal state through 
publications such as Richard Bonney, ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c.1200-1815 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick K. O’Brien, eds., The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global 
History, 1500-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Wenkai He, Paths toward the Modern Fiscal 
State: England, Japan, and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013); Andrew Monson and 
Walter Scheidel, eds., Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). For one of the initial articulations of the fiscal state, see also Joseph Schumpeter, “The 
Crisis of the Tax State” (1918), in Richard Swedberg, ed., Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of 
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 99-140. 
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but at other times proved a political and economic liability.29 Viewed across multiple historical 
examples similar policies may result in quite disparate outcomes, and forms of tax collection 
once categorized as “early modern” can be seen to be repurposed under certain conditions in the 
twenty-first century.30 Thus separated from normative frameworks of development (be they 
political, economic, or both), the new studies of fiscal states focus attention instead toward the 
institutions and processes mobilized by states to financially sustain themselves.   
 In analyzing the transformation of taxation and government finance within Korea, I pay 
particular attention to two related challenges that the state had to manage in order to effectively 
gather revenue, namely the twin problems of information and negotiation. In order for any state 
to enact even the simplest of taxes, it must have an idea of the boundaries of the taxable 
jurisdiction, the unit of assessment (i.e., the village, the individual, or the household), and against 
which measure (i.e., in proportion to harvest or income, wealth, or unit of activity (per boat built, 
per boat sold, or per tree felled, for example)). The pursuit of such knowledge represents a 
constant endeavor on the government’s behalf, requiring the updating of relevant records in line 
with demographic and economic change, as well as some degree of monitoring to prevent fraud. 
As different governments in Korea attempted to raise money through novel forms of taxation, the 
need to secure adequate information would be a recurring challenge, requiring the active 
cultivation of sources of local knowledge.  
Related to the problem of information is that of negotiation. Revenue extraction—by 
means of taxation or otherwise—necessarily involves aspects of negotiation, whether between 
                                                 
29 He, Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State, 24-50. 
30 Edgar Kiser and Audrey Sacks, “Improving Tax Administration in Contemporary African States: Lessons from 
History,” in Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad, eds., The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation 
in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 183-200; He, Paths 
toward the Modern Fiscal State; Maria E. Mata, “From Pioneer Mercantile State To Ordinary Fiscal State: Portugal 
16th-19th Centuries,” in Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, eds., The Rise of Fiscal States, 215-232. 
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different departments within the same government, with non-state rivals who might challenge the 
state for the right to the same resources, or with citizens who might vote for or against certain 
taxes. Even under the most coercive regime a degree of bargaining between the taxer and the 
taxed can be observed, as in the guise of tax resistance or rebellions against undue predations. 
Negotiation may occur at the moment of payment, but might also be observed over access to the 
information that makes taxation possible. Thus, one of the common forms of tax avoidance 
during the Chosŏn dynasty can be seen in the misclassification of land or hidden fields (ŭn’gyŏl) 
or underreporting household size on the household register that served as the basis for certain 
forms of taxation. As successive regimes sought the information on which to base new taxes 
negotiations emerged on all sides—among those being taxed, and from within the government as 
it sought to justify its taxes and increase compliance.  
 
Crisis and Reform Across Three Fiscal Regimes 
 
In common with many early modern states, the finances of the Chosŏn government were divided 
between multiple offices and were not subject to the overview of a single finance ministry. By 
the nineteenth century, the Chosŏn dynasty had assembled a patchwork of financial claims and 
practices. Multiple offices within the government collected and disbursed discrete streams of 
revenue, including several classes of land tax payments measured against the area and grade of 
cultivated land, income from a regularized system of grain loans, government monopolies over 
the official ginseng trade, a military cloth tax assessed against commoner households, and 
myriad miscellaneous taxes levied on particular industries (such as fishing or salt production), as 
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well as additional contributions toward the running of local government offices.31 Complicating 
matters further, not all lands were taxed in the same way. Under the comparative quota system 
(pich’ongje) introduced in the mid-eighteenth century, the government adjusted the land tax 
burden in each region according to the harvest.32 What is more, a significant proportion of land 
fell into various categories of tax exemption (as much as 39 percent of the total assessed land in 
1769).33 Among the major categories of tax exemptions were land granted to various palaces, the 
military, and local government offices who received the rental income from fields in lieu of 
taxation.34  
Despite its complexities, the Chosŏn financial system proved remarkably stable over the 
years. Analysis by Kim Chaeho shows that between 1730 and 1864 the income of two of the 
most important tax-receiving offices—the Ministry of Taxation (hojo) and the Taedong 
Dispensary Office (sŏnhyech’ŏng)—remained largely stable, while expenditures of the two 
offices increased only toward the end of the same period with increased spending through the 
Ministry of Military Affairs (pyŏngjo).35 Although not without some problems of corruption and 
inefficiency, the financial system was nevertheless sufficiently flexible to mobilize significant 
                                                 
31 Though different offices retained nominal control over each source of revenue, departments also transferred funds 
between one another complicating the situation further. For a thorough account of the Board of Taxation’s 
competition over revenues within the central government, see Pak Soŭn, Chosŏn hugi hojo chaejŏng chŏngch’aeksa 
(Seoul: Hyean, 2008). On payments between central and local government offices, see also Son Pyŏnggyu, “Chosŏn 
hugi kukka chaewŏn ŭi chiyŏkjŏk punbae: ‘Puyŏk silch’ong (賦役實總)’ ŭi sanghanap (上下納) semul ŭl chungsim 
ŭro,” Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil 70 (2008): 57-87. In addition to the original land tax other taxes were gradually transmuted 
into land surtaxes over the years (such as the former tribute tax and a portion of the military cloth tax, under the 
taedongbŏp and kyunyŏkbŏp respectively) alongside the imposition of new taxes such as the samsumi. On the 
various reforms to taxes throughout the dynasty, see also James B. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean 
Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the late Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 769-854.  
32 For a concise overview of this system, see Son Pyŏnggyu, “Chosŏn hugi pich’ongjejŏk (比總制的) chaejŏng 
ch’egye ŭi hyŏnsŏng kwa kŭ chŏngch’isŏng,” Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil 81 (2011): 177-186.  
33 James Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Council on 
East Asian Studies, 1975), 61.  
34 Kim Tŏkjin, “Chosŏn hugi kwandunjŏn ŭi kyŏngyŏng kwa chibang chaejŏng,” Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo 25 (2003): 
83-115. 
35 Kim Chaeho, “Chosŏn hugi chungang chaejŏng ŭi unyŏng: ‘Yukjŏn chorye (六典條例)’ ŭi punsŏk ŭl chungsim 
ŭro,” Kyŏngjesahak 43 (2007): 33, 34. 
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amounts of famine relief during the early nineteenth century.36 Indeed, the Chosŏn fiscal system 
remained largely intact and without major systemic changes throughout most of the nineteenth 
century.  
Rather than acute pressures from within the fiscal system, then, reforms to taxation 
emerged in response to sustained increases in government spending from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards. Although previous rulers could certainly spend lavishly on individual projects, 
from the 1860s increased spending became a regular occurrence as the central government 
assumed a number of new financial commitments. Some of these expenditures were planned, 
while at other times circumstances forced the government’s hand. Regardless of the origin, the 
government’s adoption of greater financial burdens and their resolution through the 
institutionalization of new revenue streams drove the fiscal reforms of this period. 
Within three years of taking the throne, Kojong and his father, the Taewŏn’gun, 
committed to three major expenses: the restoration of the Kyŏngbok palace from 1865, the 
recapitalization of the grain loan system between 1864 and 1866, and increased spending on 
military defense from 1866 onwards against incursions from France and the United States. In 
themselves, the projects were not especially revolutionary. The restoration of the Kyŏngbok 
palace, destroyed during the Hideyoshi invasions of 1590s, and the reform of the grain loan 
system were familiar concerns within the government. Previous rulers had also made plans to 
restore the Kyŏngbok palace, while a series of peasant rebellions against high fees and 
corruption within the grain loan system prompted discussion of its reform during the reign of 
King Ch’ŏlchong (r. 1849-1864).37 Defending Korean borders against foreign intrusion also 
                                                 
36 Anders Karlsson, “Famine Relief, Social Order, and State Performance in Late Chosŏn Korea,” Journal of Korean 
Studies 12, no. 1 (2007): 113-141. 
37 Palais, Politics and Policy, 38, 39, 132-149. 
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followed established precedent, leading the government to reject several requests from countries 
seeking trade with Korea earlier in the nineteenth century. By 1866, however, the intensity of 
foreign advances increased to the point of military action when an American ship, the General 
Sherman, attempted to sail up the Taedong river. Later that year, a contingent of French military 
vessels attacked Korea in retaliation for the execution of French Catholic missionaries. Both 
incidents elicited a military response, with further disturbances in 1868 and 1871 only adding to 
expenses.38   
Although the precise amounts are unclear due to the absence of a single government 
budget, the combined expenditure on the three projects was considerable. Previous studies have 
estimated the cost of the Kyŏngbok palace reconstruction at 15,000,000 yang, and the 
recapitalization of granaries at 1,800,000 yang.39 The total military budget is unknown, but one 
recent study calculates a total of at least 593,287 yang worth of supplemental payments made to 
military and naval offices between 1865 and 1874, with further sums paid in the form of land 
grants and annual allowances of cloth and grain.40 Given that the total income of the Board of 
Taxation was around 4,500,000 yang in 1864, the vast majority of which was consumed by 
existing spending, each of these projects represented a considerable expense beyond the ordinary 
financial commitments of the Chosŏn government.41 
                                                 
38 Yŏn Kapsu, Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi puguk kangbyŏng chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo 
Chʻulpʻanbu, 2001).  
39 Kikuchi Kenjō, Kindai Chōsenshi (Keijō: 1937), 84, 89; Palais, Politics and Policy, pp. 153, 154, 301 fn.113. 
40 Military offices received an additional 50 p’il of cloth per year, and 50,000 sŏm per year through a supplemental 
“artillery rice” tax (p’oryangmi). Yi Chaeŭn and Yi Yŏnghŭi, “Kuhanmal kŭndaejŏk chibang chaejŏng chedo toip 
kwajŏng e kwanhan yŏn’gu,” Han’guk chibangse yŏn’guwŏn chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu pogosŏ no. 40, 2014, 35.  
41 Data on 1864 finances is taken from the Yukjŏn chorye, as cited in Kim Chaeho, “Chosŏn hugi chungang chaejŏng 
ŭi unyŏng.” Following Kim’s conversion methods, the estimate of 4.5 million yang converts payments in kind at the 
rate of 5 yang per 1 sŏk of rice. 
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The trend toward greater spending continued after Kojong came of age and resumed 
personal rule. In 1874, Kojong implemented a ban on the use of Qing cash within Korea, at a 
stroke removing an estimated three to four million yang from circulation and precipitating a 
financial crisis.42 From 1876, Korea’s expanding diplomacy introduced a new realm of expenses 
as the government looked to strengthen the economy and military through spending on 
diplomacy, educational missions abroad and the importation of foreign technologies. During the 
1880s, the Korean government invested in several study and diplomatic missions abroad, 
purchased machinery for a new mint and for a workshop to produce military equipment, 
established a maritime customs service with offices in each open port, telegraph communications 
linking Korea to China and Japan, and an experimental farm to investigate western agricultural 
methods and crops.43  
In later decades, government spending continued to increase as the goals of reform and 
modernization placed a heightened emphasis on technology, commerce, and education as an 
essential foundation for the new Korean state. Following the Kabo reforms and the establishment 
of the Great Korean Empire, projects begun in the 1880s—including updating the military and 
investing in electric power, the telegram, and agriculture—expanded through the 1890s and 
1900s, while additional items such as a nationwide cadastral survey, reforms to weights and 
measures, and the construction of railways, streetcars, and schools added to government 
                                                 
42 Though technically forbidden, Qing cash had been circulating as de facto currency since the 1860s.  
Palais, Politics and Policy, 173, 220-25; Wŏn Yuhan, “Tangojŏn go,” Yŏksa hakpo 35-36 (1967): 316; Kim 
Sŏnghye, “Kojong ch’injŏng chikhu ch’ŏngjŏn kwallyŏn chŏngch’aek kwa kŭ t’ŭkching,” Yŏksa yŏn’gu 22 (2012): 
169-202. 
43 Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, passim; Kim Yŏngjin and Hong Ŭnmi, “Nongmu mokch’uk sihŏmjang (農
務牧畜試験場 1884–1906) ŭi kigu pyŏndong kwa unyŏng,” Nongŏpsa yŏn’gu 5, no. 2 (2006): 71-85; Kim Yŏngjin 
and Kim Igyo, “Kaehwagi (開化期) Han’guk ŭi kumi (歐美) nongŏp kwahak kisul toip e kwanhan chonghap 
yŏn’gu,” Nongŏpsa yŏn’gu 10, no. 2 (2011): 1-25; Leighanne Yuh, “Guns, Farms, and Foreign Languages: The 
Introduction of Western Learning and the First Government Schools in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea,” 
Paedagogica Historica 52, no. 6 (2016): 580-95. 
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expenses.44 Despite achieving a significant increase in tax collection under the newly 
reorganized government, figures from the national budget show that government spending 
outstripped tax income nearly every year from 1896 onwards as the government struggled to 
reconcile new sources of income with increased expenses (see Figure 1). 
In this regard, the annexation of Korea by Japan brought no great change to the trend 
toward increasing government spending. During the protectorate period (1905-1910) and first 
decade of colonial rule, Japanese administrators maintained the goal of financial self-sufficiency 
and a balanced budget which they attempted to achieve through controlled government spending 
and tax reforms.45 Although this would remain a goal throughout the period, from the 1920s 
onwards government spending increased markedly due to increased social spending associated 
with Cultural Rule and ambitious economic programs such as the Program to Increase Rice 
Production. Despite a series of tax reforms in the 1920s and 1930s that aimed to maximize 
revenues to match increased spending, financial self-sufficiency remained an elusive goal as 
increased spending continued into the 1930s, reaching a peak during wartime mobilization. 
Indeed, throughout the entirety of colonial rule, Korea relied upon grants and loans from Japan in 
order to balance its budget, with the combined ratio of public debt and supplemental funds not 
falling below ten percent of total annual government income, often reaching closer to fifteen or 
twenty percent.46  
Overall, from the 1860s onwards, Korea underwent an extended period of increasing  
 
                                                 
44 Jae-gon Cho, “The Industrial Promotion Policy and Commercial Structure of the Taehan Empire,” in Kim, 
Duncan and Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity, 235-66; Kim Taejun, Kojong sidae ŭi kukka chaejŏng yŏn’gu (Seoul: 
T’aehaksa, 2004); Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 123-31.  
45 “Chōsen zaisei no dokuritsu keikaku,” Chōsen sōtokufu geppō 4, no. 8 (1914): 1-3. 
46 Chōsen sōtokufu, Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō (multiple years); Mitsuhiko Kimura, “Public Finance in Korea 
under Japanese Rule: Deficit in the Colonial Account and Colonial Taxation,” Explorations in Economic History 26 
(1989): 185-310. 
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Figure 1: Government spending and tax income, 1896-1904 
  
Source: “Kakse silip illamp’yo,” “seip silji subong’aek” as cited in Yi Sunsang, “Ilche e ŭi han singminji 
chaejŏng ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng: 1894-1910 nyŏn ŭi seip kujo wa chingse kigu rŭl chungsim ŭro,” 
Han’guk saron 14 (1986): 299. The heading “other income” refers to income from government-
enterprises, including the publication of the kwanbo official gazette, the postal service, and the telegraoh 
service. These figures do not include the income of the Royal Household or income from non-tax sources, 
such as loans or seignorage. 
 
government spending. The causes of this were varied, from the costs of individual crises to the 
ongoing burden of costs associated with long-standing projects, such as the restoration of 
Kyŏngbok palace, and government investment in new technologies, such as the railroad. As far 
as existing forms of revenue proved insufficient to cover such increased expenses, each fiscal 
regime to be discussed held the potential for government innovation in the development of new 
sources of revenue and changes to taxation. 
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Faced with the costs of restoring the palace, recapitalizing the grain loan system, and increased 
spending on defense, the government adopted several strategies to secure new funds. Initially, 
the government attempted to raise funds through a variety of temporary, informal measures. In 
the reconstruction of the Kyŏngbok palace, the government mobilized corvée labor and solicited 
voluntary donations (wŏnnap), even transferring 100,000 yang from the Royal Treasury as an 
exemplar.47 In total, James Palais estimates that voluntary contributions provided 7,728,693 
yang—just over half of the estimated total costs of palace reconstruction—in addition to 
contributions of wood, rice, and white alum.48 The government also transferred existing wealth 
in the initial payments toward the recapitalization of local granaries and increasing military 
expenses. In 1866, the royal household donated 300,000 yang to granaries after writing off bad 
grain loans and 80,000 yang to supplement the military budget.49 Later, in a pinch after removing 
some three to four million yang worth of Qing cash from circulation, Kojong would again 
transfer existing sources of wealth to cover shortfalls in the central government’s reserves, this 
time drawing funds from the newly-recapitalized regional granaries.50   
The government also diverted or expanded existing patterns of taxation. The Ministry of 
Taxation claimed an increasing portion of the receipts from the official ginseng trade which it 
diverted toward military expenses.51 Between 1866 and 1870, the government removed 
exemptions on the military cloth tax, requiring formerly-exempt elite yangban households to pay 
                                                 
47 Kojong sillok, 2.4.5 (1865); 2.4.8 (1865).  
48 Palais, Politics and Policy, 40. Of the total 7,728,693 yang, 450,913 yang were attributed to donations from the 
palace treasury and royal household, with 7,277,780 yang from individuals. The degree to which these voluntary 
donations were truly voluntary is questionable.  
49 Ibid., 153; Kojong sillok, 3.5.12 (1866); Kojong sillok, 3.8.1 (1866); Kojong sillok, 3.9.1 (1866).  
50 Palais, Politics and Policy, 220-225; Kim Sŏnghye, “Kojong ch’injŏng chikhu Ch’ŏngjŏn kwallyŏn chŏngch’aek” 
51 Yi Ch’ŏlsŏng, “Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi p’osam muyŏk chŏngch’aek kwa haesang milmuyŏk,” Chosŏn sidae 
hakpo 35 (2005): 211. In 1866, for example, the taxes from 15,000 kŭn of ginseng were diverted toward military 
expenses. At the official rate of 1 yang 5 chŏn of silver per kŭn, this would have provided a revenue of 30,000 yang 
in silver. Ibid, 209; Kojong sillok, 3.11.4 (1866). 
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the tax alongside commoners.52 A temporary surtax on the land tax raised an estimated 
2,000,000 yang in 1868 toward the costs of the palace restoration, while the government 
removed land tax exemptions from private academies the same year.53 The government also 
introduced new surtaxes, such as the p’oryangmi, or artillery rice, which garnered roughly 
50,000 sŏk of rice per year.54 A new miscellaneous “gate tax” (tosŏng munse) on persons 
entering Seoul further supplemented the funds for palace reconstruction. Though incomplete, 
records from two out of the total seven gates that levied the tax record an income of roughly 
8,000 yang per year between 1869 and 1873.55 
New taxes on maritime trade also added to the central government’s income. In 1883, the 
government established a system for tariff collection and installed customs offices at each of the 
open ports under the authority of the newly-established Office for the General Control of 
Diplomatic and Commercial Matters (t’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang samu amun, est. 1882).56 The 
maritime customs service represented an important new stream of revenue for the government at 
a time when most other sources of taxation remained flat, if not decreasing slightly.57 Moreover, 
unlike the existing taxes that were already earmarked for particular government departments, 
maritime customs were particularly suited to novel spending projects. Indeed, as early as 1879 Li 
Hongzhang advised the Korean government to establish a system for maritime customs as a 
                                                 
52 Palais, Politics and Policy, 105-107. 
53 Ibid, 40, 124, 125, 301 fn. 103; Ching Young Choe, The Rule of the Taewŏn’gun, 1864-1873: Restoration in Yi 
Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1972), 36-38, 76. 
54 Kojong sillok, 8.5.25 (1871).  
55 Yŏn Kapsu, Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi, 218-221. 
56 On the diplomacy underlying the establishment of the maritime customs service, the negotiations with  
Japan over the establishment of trade tariffs and the role of China in supporting the new customs service, see Kim 
Kyŏngt’ae, “Kaehang chikhu ŭi kwansegwŏn hoebok munje: ‘Pusan haegwan suse sagŏn’ ŭl chungsim ŭro,” 
Han’guksa yŏn’gu 8 (1972): 693-723; Kojong sillok, 16.7.9 (1879); Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, 65-69, 
103-42.  
57 Ibid, 146, fn. 60.   
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contribution toward national finances.58 As well as the customs revenues themselves, the 
government was able to use future customs receipts as collateral for loans with foreign 
merchants, banks, and governments to further enhance revenues for spending on new projects 
(see Table 1). The government funded several of its investments in foreign technologies in this 
way, including the establishment of the customs service itself, study tours to Japan, and wages 
for foreign advisers working in areas such as schools, and a sericulture bureau, and mint, to name 
just a few.59 By 1894, on the eve of the Kabo reforms, the government had made a significant 
number of foreign loans, mostly secured against future customs revenue. As can be seen from the 
uses of the loans shown in Table 1, whether used to repay previous loans, indemnity payments, 
or to fund investments in new technology, the loans mostly funded novel, discretionary 
government spending, rather than contributing toward the running of existing government 
offices, a fact also reflected in the administrative separation of the customs service from the 
Ministry of Taxation. 
However, in terms of value raised, new currencies far outstripped all other sources of 
increased income. Early in 1867, in the space of just six months, the government minted an 
estimated 16 million yang of a new coin, the tangbaekchŏn (one hundred cash), of which 1.5 
million yang was utilized to recapitalize the granaries with a further 180,400 yang transferred 
toward military expenses throughout the year.60 Later the same year, the government also 
authorized the use of Qing cash within Korea, further boosting the money supply.61 Like the 
Taewŏn’gun before him, Kojong also minted a new currency—the tangojŏn (five cash)— 
                                                 
58 Kojong sillok 16.7.9 (1879). 
59 Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, 144; Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi Ch’ŏng ch’akwan toip (1882-
1894),” Han’guksaron 3 (1976): 403-489; Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi Tokil ch’akwan toip (1883-1894),” 
Han’guksa yŏn’gu 39 (1982): 85-120.  
60 Wŏn Yuhan, “Tangojŏn go,” Yŏksa hakpo 35-36 (1967): 315, 316; Palais, Politics and Policy, 154. The currency 
was withdrawn in 1868.  
61 Kojong sillok, 4.6.3 (1867). 
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Table 1: Foreign loans to the Korean government, 1882-1894 
Year Amount Lender Collateral  Purpose of loan 
1882       28,250 yang Qing Ginseng tax Study mission to Tianjin  
1882        2,999 yang Qing   Construction of official residence in 
Tianjin 
1882     120,500 yen Yokohama  
Specie Bank 
 Indemnity payment (Treaty of 
Chemulp’o), study trip to Japan 
1882     210,000 yang Qing Maritime 
customs 
Establish maritime customs 
1882-
1883 
       3,540 yang Qing Ginseng tax Purchase machinery, establish 
Machine Hall 
1884       24,000 yen First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
 Operation of maritime customs 
1885     100,000 yang Qing   Installation of overland telegraph 
1886    20,000 pounds 
 (112,280 dollars) 
H.C.E. Meyer  
and Co. 
Maritime 
customs 
Indemnity payment, interest payment 
on Yokohama Specie Bank loan 
1886       30,000 dollars H.C.E. Meyer  
and Co. 
 Purchase of mint equipment  
1886-
1894 
   508,888 yen  First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Maritime 
customs 
Wages of foreign advisers, repayment 
of loans (Qing, H.C.E. Meyer and Co.) 
1887       44,490 dollars H.C.E. Meyer  
and Co. 
 Purchase of telegraph equipment  
1887    125,400 dollars H.C.E. Meyer  
and Co. 
 Purchase of steamship 
1887        1,487 dollars H.C.E. Meyer  
and Co. 
 Wages for mint engineer  
1887         2,000 yang Qing   Expenses of Koreans in Tianjin  
1892         2,800 yang Qing   Repairs to Wŏnsan pier  
1892     100,000 yang Tong Shuntai 
(merchant) 
Inch’ŏn 
maritime 
customs 
Repayment of loans (H.C.E. Meyer 
and Co., indemnity payment loan) 
1892     100,000 yang Tong Shuntai 
(merchant) 
Inch’ŏn, Pusan 
maritime 
customs  
Repayment of loans (Townsend, 
National First Bank) 
1893     35,000 yang Qing   Indemnity payment re: prevention of 
grain exports (panggongnyŏng) 
1893 50,000 yen HSBC  Construction, maritime customs 
expenses, indemnity payments 
Source: Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi Ch’ŏng ch’akwan,”; Kim Chŏnggi, “Chosŏn chŏngbu ŭi 
Tokil ch’akwan; Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek,”; Larsen, Tradition Treaties and 
Trade, 143. 
Note: Due to a lack of inflation data for the period in question, it is difficult to convert all loans into yang. 
As a rough guide, as of 1892 the prevailing silver dollar to yang conversion rate appears to have been 
around 1.48 silver dollars per yang. See, Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek kwa 
kwanse ŭi unyŏng,” Han’guksaron 15 (1986): 322. 
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sending at least 620,000 yang of the currency to fund government offices between 1883 and 
1884 alone. While the tangbaekchŏn and Qing cash were swiftly withdrawn from circulation 
over concerns for inflation and a lack of popular support for the coins, the government continued 
to produce the tangojŏn until 1894 when it was replaced with several new denominations. 
Because the tangojŏn was produced at multiple locations, and to varying quality, it is unclear 
how much was produced overall. But, based on the amount of metal imported for coin 
production, the volume appears to have increased over time. After importing an average of 
around 3,000 tam per year between 1885 and 1887, the amount of metal imported for currency 
production increased dramatically to an average of around 30,000 tam per year between 1888 
and 1893.62 Like the tangbaekchŏn and Qing cash before it, the new currency swiftly proved 
inflationary and struggled to win public confidence as the quality of the coins declined over time. 
Nonetheless, and unlike previous experiments with new currencies, the government kept the 
tangojŏn in circulation until 1894, when it was replaced with several new denominations 
including the paektonghwa nickel coin. 
In sum, attempts to increase government revenues during the early decades of Kojong’s 
rule favored the cultivation of new income streams. Despite the Taewŏn’gun’s expansion of the 
military cloth tax to yangban households, most new income raised came from one-off, informal 
measures or through the development of maritime customs, loans, and the seignorage from 
minting new currencies. Even the establishment of an administration to support the maritime 
customs office lay outside of the existing organization of major government offices, which 
continued to administer taxes and distribute revenues largely as before.  
                                                 
62 Wŏn Yuhan, “Tangojŏn go”; O Tuhwan, “Tangojŏn yŏn’gu,” Kyŏngje sahak 6 (1983): 165-227. One tam 擔 is 
equivalent to roughly 50 kilograms.  
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Reforming the Chosŏn state, 1894—1905 
 
The Kabo reform period of 1894–1896 introduced major changes to the organization of the 
Korean government. Under increased Japanese influence following the first Sino-Japanese War 
(1894–1895), pro-enlightenment officials gained the opportunity to enact a series of major 
reforms to the Korean government. Over several bursts of legislation, enlightenment reformers 
replaced the Six Boards with a cabinet-style structure which consolidated the work of the 
government within a new set of government ministries. The Kabo reforms ended in 1896 after 
Kojong fled from the Japan-sponsored court to the Russian legation, declaring a new regime, the 
Great Korean Empire, the following year. However, the basic state organization established 
during the Kabo reforms would remain in place throughout the Korean empire period.63   
Despite their ambitious plans to reshape the Korean government, the Kabo reforms did 
little to alleviate the financial pressures facing the government. On the contrary, securing and 
increasing tax revenues became an even greater concern following the Tonghak rebellion, which 
saw large numbers of peasants revolt in protest against a combination of high taxes, corruption 
among local government officials, and the increased presence of foreigners in the new treaty port 
regions. The Kabo reforms, begun in the middle of the rebellion, were thus forced to address 
popular concerns about the burden of high taxes all the while maintaining financial support for 
the government’s investment in new technologies.  
                                                 
63 For more detail on the progression of the Kabo reforms, see Kyung Moon Hwang, “Governmental Growth in the 
Taehan Empire Era: Origins of the Modern Korean State,” in Kim, Duncan and Kim, eds., Reform and Modernity, 
157-210; Wang Hyŏnjong, Han’guk kŭndae kukka ŭi hyŏnsŏng kwa Kabo kaehyŏk (Seoul: Yŏksa pip’yŏngsa, 
2003).  
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In order to achieve the three simultaneous goals of reducing the tax burden on peasants, 
reducing corruption among local officials, and increasing revenue for further investment, the 
government attempted to overhaul the entire tax system. The Kabo government replaced multiple 
layers of land taxes with a single payment per unit of land, with different tax grades depending 
on the type and quality of the land.64 Further reforms abolished miscellaneous taxes and required 
taxes to be paid in cash rather than in kind.65 Alongside the new tax codes, the government 
attempted to increase the amount of land subject to taxation by reclassifying formerly tax-exempt 
lands (such as post station lands or military fields (tunjŏn)), adding hidden fields to tax registers, 
and reassessing the quality (and therefore the tax rate) of taxable lands.66  
In combination, these measures were intended to equalize the tax burden, increasing total 
revenue while decreasing the individual burden, although this was not always achieved in 
practice. Tenants of formerly tax-exempt state-owned lands complained of dual taxation as they 
paid both rents and taxes to the government under the new system. Attempts to include hidden 
fields did not always succeed, and at times reassessment even provided the opportunity for new 
parcels of land to go missing from the official register. The practice of re-grading land taxes by 
the county, and collecting taxes by the township or village also led some farmers’ taxes to rise 
disproportionately over those of their neighbors despite the lower, theoretically uniform, rate. 
                                                 
64 Initially the taxes distinguished between mountain and coastal land, with five tax grades. Later changes introduced 
thirteen separate tax grades, ranging from 30 yang per kyŏl for the best land to 5 yang per kyŏl at the lowest end of 
the scale. Most land fell into the upper categories, with 76 percent of land assessed at 20 yang or higher, and 50 
percent of all land taxed at the top rate. Wang Hyŏnjong, “Hanmal (1894-1904) chise chedo ŭi kaehyŏk kwa 
sŏnggyŏk,” Han’guksa yŏn’gu 77 (1992): 89-123.  
65 Kojong sillok, 31.7.10 (1894); 32.8.25 (1985).  
66 Kojong sillok, 31.9.17 (1894).  
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Nonetheless, the recalculation of taxable lands provided a modest increase in the tax base from 
57 percent of total land in 1893 to 66.7 percent in 1896.67  
Beyond adjustments to the land tax itself, a further change to the financial system came in 
the restructuring of government offices. Within the central government, the Kabo reforms placed 
control of all government finances, including those of the Royal Household, under the new 
Ministry of Finance, the T’akji-amun (renamed the T’akjibu in 1895). For the first time, a single 
ministry oversaw the budgets of all other government departments and was tasked with the 
creation of national accounts. To do so, an accounting section (hoegyegwa) was established 
within each government ministry to prepare the ministry’s budgets and correspond with the 
Ministry of Finance. A similar system was also planned for local government offices as part of a 
series of measures designed to separate local government offices from the direct handling of 
taxes, although this measure was never fully implemented.68 Nonetheless, the Ministry of 
Finance greatly expanded its authority over local government finances through new controls over 
local government expenses and the elimination of miscellaneous taxes which local governments 
had previously relied upon to augment their revenue.69   
Overall, the financial reforms were partially successful in their attempt to raise tax 
income to meet government spending. The Ministry of Finance made a concerted effort to 
increase revenues from the land tax, surveying local offices on their income and expenses and 
                                                 
67 On these points, see Sŏ T’aewŏn, “Chosŏn hugi Ch’ungch’ŏng-do P’yŏngsin-dun ŭi sŏlch’i wa kyŏngyŏng,” 
Kyujanggak 37 (2010): 69-99; Yi Yŏngho, “Hanmal~Ilche ch’o kŭndaejŏk t’oji soyukwŏn ŭi hwakjang kwa kukyu-
minyu ŭi pun’gi: Kyŏnggi-do Ansan Sŏkjang-dun (石場屯) ŭi sarye,” Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil (2010): 281-319; Yu 
Chŏnghyŏn, “1894-1904 nyŏn chibang chaejŏng chedo ŭi kaehyŏk kwa isŏch’ŭng tonghyang,” Chindan hakpo 73 
(1992): 63-119; Wang Hyŏnjong, “Hanmal (1894-1904) chise chedo.” 
68 “Ch’ingnyŏng 56: Kwansesa kŭp chingsesŏ kwanje,” 1895.4.20; “Ch’ingnyŏng 159: kwansesa kŭp chingsesŏ 
kwanje pyŏng kak’ŭp pukwaseso changjŏng chŏngji kŏn,” 1895.10.22, Kojong sidaesa 3-chip, accessed via 
db.history.go.kr.    
69 “Ch’ingnyŏng 36: Chibang jedo wa kwanje mit ponggŭp kwa kyŏngbi ŭi kaejŏng e kwanhan kŏn,” 1896.9.10, 
Kojong sidaesa 4-chip; Yu Chŏnghyŏn, “1894-1904 nyŏn chibang chaejŏng chedo.”  
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later initiating a nationwide land survey to correct outdated land registers. Though the land 
survey remained incomplete, over time revenues did indeed increase, as shown in Figure 1. In 
the wake of the (partial) land survey, and after some adjustments to the tax rate, revenue from the 
land tax nearly tripled between 1900 and 1904. Despite this success, however, increases from 
taxation were not sufficient to support concurrent increases in expenditure leaving the 
government to find other supplemental sources of income.   
As in earlier years, the minting of currency served as a significant source of additional 
revenue. In an attempt to control the inflation of earlier years, an 1894 ordinance on the issuance 
of new currencies introduced five new denominations fixed against a silver yang.70 In practice, 
however, there were few controls on the issuance of coins and the government produced large 
volumes of one denomination in particular—the paektonghwa nickel coin. Between 1894 and 
1904, the government produced nearly seventeen million wŏn worth of paektonghwa coins at a 
rate that closely corresponded to the gap between tax receipts and government spending during 
the same period. This helped to solve some of the government’s immediate financial difficulties, 
but was not without consequence. As the mass production of the paektonghwa stoked inflation, 
the value of the taxes collected by the government decreased to as little as one-third of the 
original amount. In 1900, the government recalculated land taxes accordingly, raising the highest 
rate to 50 yang, although as a result of inflation even this revised figure represented a real 
decrease in the value of taxes.71   
The government also continued to rely upon maritime customs as a supplement to other 
forms of taxation. Although the government continued to receive some revenue directly from 
maritime customs, over the years the value of future maritime customs as collateral for foreign 
                                                 
70 “Sinsik hwap’ye palhaeng changjŏng,” August, 1894, reprinted in Ōkurashō, Kahei hōki (Tokyo: 1910), 117, 118.  
71 Kojong sillok, 40.10.19 (1900); Wang Hyŏnjong, “Hanmal (1894-1904) chise chedo,” 117.    
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loans eclipsed customs receipts themselves as a direct source of revenue. Overall, between 1895 
and 1905, foreign loans (most secured against maritime customs) provided the government with 
some eight million yen worth of additional funds toward spending on various reform projects, as 
shown in Table 2. Unlike earlier foreign loans, Japanese banks now dominated the supply of 
loans during the post-Kabo period reflecting the decline of Chinese influence and increase in 
Japanese influence in Korea following the Sino-Japanese war.  
Thus, despite the reform of government offices and the institution of the land survey, 
several features of the tax system remained the same. Loans, customs receipts, and new 
currencies continued to form a significant portion of government income. Just as with the pre-
Kabo government, a reliance on sources of income that lay outside of the main tax system stands 
in contrast to the conflict over resources that emerged within the government. Despite nominal 
control over all government finance, throughout the 1890s the Ministry of Finance lost access to 
several streams of revenue. Thanks in part to its prior administration as a separate office and also 
due to the immense authority granted to the chief commissioner of customs by the Imperial 
Household, Chief Customs Commissioner (ch’ong semusa) John MacLeavy Brown increasingly 
managed maritime customs revenues without reference to the Ministry of Finance.72 
Competition also emerged between the Ministry of Finance and the Office of Crown 
Property (Naejangwŏn, an office within the Palace Department (kungnaebu)), as the latter 
claimed authority over the rental income from government lands and newly reintroduced 
miscellaneous taxes. By 1905, estimates of the total income from such sources reached nearly 5 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 According to one critical assessment, MacLeavy Brown ran the maritime customs as if it were his own private 
institution. Kim Hyŏnsuk, Kŭndae Han’guk ŭi sŏyangin komun’gwandŭl (Seoul: Han’guk yŏn’guwŏn, 2008), 300-
305. 
33 
 
Table 2: Foreign loans to the Korean government, 1895-1905 
Year Amount (yen) Lender Collateral Purpose of loan 
1895 130,000 First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Inch’ŏn customs 
receipts 
Salaries  
1895 3,000,000 Bank of Japan Taxes, maritime 
customs 
Government reform 
1900 300,000 First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Ginseng monopoly Palace expansion expenses 
1901-1905 1,220,000 First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Taxes, paektonghwa Payment for military 
supplies and other expenses 
1902-1904 250,000 First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Income from Office of 
Weights and Measures 
(P’yŏngsikwŏn) 
Improving weights and 
measures 
1905 3,000,000 First (Daiichi) 
Bank 
Maritime customs Currency reform 
1905 150,000 Bank of Japan  Emergency relief re: 
financial crisis 
Source: Data from Kim Sundŏk, “1876-1905 nyŏn kwanse chŏngch’aek”; Yu Wŏndong, “Hanmal Ilbon 
ŭi ch’agwan kongse wa kwangsan chŏpkŭn e kwan han yŏn’gu,” Kuksa kwannon ch’ong 20 (1990): 141-
74.  
 
 
million wŏn, an amount equivalent to roughly two-thirds of the total land tax receipts.73 Conflict 
within the government was also matched with conflict in local areas at the site of collection, as 
the Office of Crown Property dispatched its own tax assessors and collectors rather than rely 
upon existing local government offices. Although this period saw the institutionalization of 
several new practices in taxation, institutionalization proceeded along several lines, with 
competition among the different government offices determining the degree of financial 
centralization.   
 
Reform Under Empire, 1905—1945  
 
                                                 
73 Ibid.; “Chohoe il-ho,” Hullyŏng chonan, 1900.1.4; Pak Sŏngjun, “Taehan chegukki haese kwanhalgwŏn ŭl 
tullŏssan kaldŭng kwa naejangwŏn ŭi haese kwanhalgwŏn changak,” Han’guksa hakbo 26 (2007): 245-284; Pak 
Sŏngjun, “1894-1910 nyŏn haese chedo ŭi pyŏnhwa wa seje chŏngbi ŭi panghyang,” Han’guksa yŏn’gu 128 (2005): 
219-256; Moon, Populist Collaborators, 167-170; Kankoku seifu zaimu komonbu, Kankoku zaisei seiri hōkoku, vol. 
1 (Keijō: 1905), 4.5. 
34 
 
As Japanese influence in Korea increased in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
and according to the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and Taft-Katsura agreement, the 
Japanese government appointed advisors to the Korean cabinet to oversee major government 
decisions. At the Ministry of Finance, Megata Tanetarō (1853-1926) introduced a wide-ranging 
series of reforms which introduced many aspects of the colonial fiscal system. In terms of 
structural organization, Megata reestablished the Ministry of Finance as the sole financial 
authority within the central government, reverting income from miscellaneous taxes, government 
lands, and government monopolies (such as that on ginseng), to the Ministry by 1908.74 Megata 
also oversaw the establishment of the First Bank (Daiichi ginkō) as the de facto central bank for 
Korea in 1904, a change that became permanent in 1911 when the bank was rechristened the 
Bank of Chōsen.75 Following a currency reform that removed the inflationary paektonghwa 
coins from circulation, the new central bank assumed responsibility for currency issuance based 
on a yen-standard thus limiting the government’s ability to mint currency as a ready source of 
income.76  
Alongside administrative reforms, the protectorate administration also sought to increase 
revenues, placing a renewed emphasis on increasing tax receipts. In his position as financial 
advisor, Megata planned a cadastral survey (implemented after annexation, between 1910 and 
1918) to replace and complete the earlier surveys begun under the Great Korean Empire 
government. Once completed, the new cadasters would provide the colonial government with 
accurate information on the amount of taxable land, enhancing its ability to collect taxes and 
                                                 
74 Pak Sŏngjun, Taehan chegukki kongmunsŏ yŏn’gu (Seoul: Amorŭmundi, 2015), 20. 
75 “Kokkokin toriatsukai ni kansuru keiyakusho,” in Kankoku zaisei seiri hōkoku, vol. 1, 2.9-2.13. For more details 
on the legal transition to the Bank of Chōsen, see Howard Kahm “Colonial Finance: Daiichi Bank and the Bank of 
Chōsen in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Korea, Japan, and Manchuria,” Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 
Department of Asian Languages and Cultures, 2012, 73-91. 
76 Michael Schiltz, The Money Doctors from Japan” Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1895-
1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), chapter 2.  
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institute a land tax based on the market value of land rather than a broad assessment of its 
quality.77 The land tax and the cadaster were just the start, however, and throughout the colonial 
period the government introduced numerous new taxes in pursuit of financial independence (see 
Figure 2).  
Until the completion of the land survey, however, the colonial government was limited in 
its ability to reform taxes. Early iterations of the land tax law explicitly stated that former 
customs would continue to apply regarding the calculation and application of tax rates.78 
Existing norms continued to apply not only to the collection and assessment of the land tax, but 
also in regard to its weight within the overall tax system. Despite the introduction of taxes on 
alcohol and tobacco, the land tax served as the single largest source of tax revenue, providing 
over 50 percent of total tax receipts until 1916.  
Following the completion of the cadastral survey, the absolute revenue of the land tax 
increased from a previous plateau of around ten million yen per year to level around fifteen 
million yen per year until 1934. Despite this increase, the proportion of the tax revenue due to the 
land tax decreased to roughly one-third of total tax income as the proportion of revenue from 
other tax sources increased, namely the alcohol tax, which steadily increased from around five 
percent of total revenue in 1918 to nearly thirty percent by 1928, and tariffs, which provided an 
average of twenty-five percent of total tax revenues between 1919 and 1934. In this way, 
taxation through the 1920s and early 1930s was characterized by the expansion of indirect taxes 
on consumption, through the alcohol tax as well as a new tax on sugar. 
 
 
                                                 
77 “Chizeirei shikō kisoku,” Chōsen sōtokufu kanpō, July 17, 1918; David Fedman, “Triangulating Chōsen: Maps, 
Mapmaking, and the Land Survey in Colonial Korea,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 1 
(2012): 205-234. 
78 Article 4, Chizei rei, March 16, 1914. 
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Figure 2: Tax income by category, 1910-1940 
 
Source: Chōsen sōtokufu tōkei nenpō, multiple years. 
Note: These figures are not adjusted for inflation. Thus, the relative proportion of sources of revenue is of 
more significance than the absolute yen values. 
 
As government spending increased from the 1920s onwards, the colonial government’s 
priority on controlling spending shifted toward an effort to increase revenues. While indirect 
taxes on consumption comprised a significant element in increased tax revenues in the 1920s, 
officials nonetheless began to express dissatisfaction with the unequal weighting and piecemeal 
structure of the tax system, the lack of elasticity among the existing taxes, and the Government 
General’s ongoing inability to cover its spending through tax revenues.79 A series of committees 
on public finances thus advocated reforms to the tax system and the introduction of several new 
taxes, in particular the personal income tax.80 As well as raising revenue and increasing 
responsiveness to prevailing economic conditions, the personal income tax was also hoped to 
                                                 
79 Chōsen sōtokufu zaimukyoku, Chōsen ni okeru zeisei seiri keika gaiyō (Keijō: 1935). 35. 
80 Ibid. 
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bring the structure of Korean taxes more in line with those of Japan, where the income tax 
provided around twenty to thirty percent of total tax revenues throughout the early 1920s. After 
its introduction in 1934, the personal income tax gradually increased its share of total tax 
revenues, reaching around twenty percent by the end of the decade. By this time, however, the 
effects of wartime mobilization extended to the tax system, and myriad additional surtaxes and 
indirect taxes led to a dramatic increase in total revenues, as shown in Figure 2. 
Nevertheless, increasing taxation only formed one part of the colonial government’s 
fiscal policies as it attempted to achieve “financial independence” (zaisei no dokuritsu) from 
Japan. A 1914 report forecast the achievement of financial independence within five years 
through a combination of economic growth, new taxes, and economies in government spending. 
As much as adjustments to tax rates and the new taxes on tobacco and alcohol were expected to 
contribute toward this goal, efforts to decrease spending within the central government also 
played a significant role in the plan. Colonial officials boasted of reducing administration costs 
by 2,350,000 yen in 1913, equivalent to nearly 17 percent of total tax revenue that same year. 81 
The colonial government’s dramatic reductions in administration costs may appear 
impressive, but the headline figures belie one important aspect of colonial period government 
spending; in order to balance its desire for austerity with the need to support colonial policies, 
the central government increasingly transferred spending liabilities from the treasury to local 
governments and other semi-governmental organizations whose finances were not included on 
the central budget. Although the central government supported local government expenses to 
some degree, local governments also drew income from surtaxes charged in addition to the 
national taxes. The impact of this was not inconsequential. To draw an example from agriculture, 
                                                 
81 “Chōsen zaisei no dokuritsu keikaku,” 1-3.  
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one of the early targets of colonial economic policies, local government spending on agriculture 
surpassed that of the central government as early as 1913, reaching as much as 70 percent of all 
government spending on agriculture by 1918.82  
The creation of industry-specific, semi-governmental organizations whose activities 
closely followed government policy yet drew much of their funding from (sometimes 
compulsory) membership dues and service fees provided yet another means for the government 
to further minimize the financial liability of funding colonial policies. Thus, when the 
government funded the Program to Increase Rice Production in the 1920s, it did so though a 
series of loans, channeled through the irrigation associations (Ko. suri chohap; Ja. suiri kumiai), 
financial associations, Industrial Bank of Chōsen, and Oriental Development Company. In this 
way, the final liability for much of the huge investment in irrigation infrastructure rested with 
individual farmers and association members, contributing toward the rise of rural indebtedness in 
the 1920s and 1930s as farmers found themselves unable to repay the debts.83 This pattern of 
reassigning spending from the central to the local government was repeated across multiple 
sectors, from infrastructure, to hygiene campaigns and spending on education.84  
 
Information and Negotiation in the Process of Reform 
 
The above summaries reveal some obvious differences between the fiscal structure and policies 
of the three regimes under analysis. Under the late-Chosŏn fiscal regime, the government 
                                                 
82 Kobayakawa Kurō, Chōsen nōgyō hattatsushi, seisaku hen (Keijō: Chōsen nōkai, 1944), 24-27. 
83 See, U Taehyŏng, “Ilcheha Man’gyŏng-gang yuyŏk suri chohap yŏn’gu,” in Hong Sŏngch’an, et al. eds., Ilcheha 
Man’gyŏng-gang yuyŏk ŭi sahoesa: suro chohap, chijuje, chiyŏk chŏngch’i (Seoul: Hyean, 2006), 27-64. 
84 Seong-cheol Oh and Ki-seok Kim, “Expansion of Elementary Schooling under Colonialism: Top Down or Bottom 
Up?,” in Lee, Ha and Sorenson, eds., Colonial Rule and Social Change, 114-139; Hwang, Rationalizing Korea, 60-
66.  
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struggled to create long-lasting increases in revenue. Many policies were directed instead toward 
supplementary finance through ad hoc measures, through the imposition of special taxes or 
soliciting “voluntary contributions.” Even when long-run policies were successfully 
implemented, as in the extension of the military cloth tax to all households in 1870, this 
proceeded under the existing system of state finances which allowed individual offices to 
calculate and manage their own finances. In such a system, securing new streams of revenue, 
such as customs duties, loans, or the seignorage from currency production, presented an 
important source of income to a government looking to increase and direct spending in new 
ways.  
 The establishment of a single Ministry of Finance during the Kabo reforms represented a 
change to the structure of state finances. For the first time, a single financial office within the 
central government was able to manipulate the budget of other departments in the name of 
national fiscal policies. However, the central position of the Ministry of Finance was quickly 
challenged by the maritime customs office and the Palace Department which siphoned revenue 
streams away from the Ministry’s authority. Although the colonial government reestablished the 
control of the Ministry of Finance over central government revenues, the central government’s 
desire to minimize its own spending encouraged the growth of alternative spheres of government 
finance in local government and semi-governmental organizations. Though not fully independent 
of the central government, finances in local government and semi-governmental organizations 
nonetheless emerged as an alternative source for conflict and negotiation within colonial local 
society, just as conflicts over tax collection were expressed through local government officials 
and rival tax collectors before colonial rule. 
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 Each fiscal regime also found itself reliant on external sources of funds as it confronted 
certain limitations in its ability to raise funds. While the government avoided the wholesale 
reorganization of taxes during the first period of reform, even frequently touted “modern” 
measures such as the cadastral survey had a limited ability to raise the income of the land tax 
indefinitely. Thus, cultivating new sources of revenue remained an important task for each 
government, be it through minting new currencies, the development of miscellaneous taxes, a 
reliance on loans and grants from Japan, or the creation of new local surtaxes. In each case, the 
benefits of such external sources of funds lay partially in the lack (or at least a lesser degree) of 
conflict over the management of preexisting resources, be it with Koreans who resented paying 
higher taxes, or among government departments competing over the same funds.  
 Where the governments did seek to develop new taxes, each confronted the problems of 
negotiation and information in different arenas. When the Taewŏn’gun attempted to increase 
revenues, he did so within a government reliant on the politics of brokerage. As discussed in the 
preceding paper, the Chosŏn state relied heavily upon individual officers and brokers to achieve 
its goals. State capacity frequently rested upon brokers, individuals recognized by the state to 
perform key tasks, be it gathering voluntary contributions, taxes, or maintaining order in remote 
offices. In line with such a context, the Taewŏn’gun’s efforts to raise funds followed several 
norms of the brokered state. The voluntary contributions that formed a major element in the 
fundraising for the Kyŏngbok palace reconstruction were often rewarded with the granting of a 
rank or title.85 Although in practice this may not have prevented coercion, the use of voluntary 
contributions appealed to principles familiar to other brokered transactions.  
                                                 
85 Palais, Politics and Policy, 39. 
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 Within such a system, formal institutions supporting information and the enforcement of 
government policy could be inconsistent. In order to maximize the revenues from the ginseng 
monopoly available to the central government, the Taewŏn’gun not only issued orders 
concerning the handling of the ginseng revenues but also dispatched officials to ensure the 
smooth implementation of his policies. As noted at the time, the careful selection of new officials 
was an important measure in minimizing abuses and increasing the amount remitted to the 
government in Seoul.86 In the introduction of the tangbaekchŏn as well, the Taewŏn’gun relied 
upon secret censors (amhaeng ŏsa) to travel the country and enforce rulings that taxes be paid in 
the new currency.87 Contrary to one prominent opinion on the Taewŏn’gun’s implementation of 
the tangbaekchŏn stating that “his faith in the efficacy of royal command was unbounded,” the 
Taewŏn’gun’s use of secret censors arguably reveals the bounds of the central government’s 
institutional reach.88 Among both the population in general and local offices receiving taxes, the 
government could not always expect compliance with official policies without the additional 
oversight provided by the censors.   
 Attempts to regularize tax collection within a centralized system under the Kabo reforms 
confronted this system, but did not necessarily overcome it. As part of the process establishing 
the Ministry of Finance, initial reform proposals transferred significant functions of tax 
collection from local governments to an independent system of tax offices. As planned, these 
offices would assign the task of assessing and collecting taxes to a parallel administrative 
system. Local clerks would be selected to assist with land registration and fielding questions over 
                                                 
86 Yi Ch’ŏlsŏng, “Taewŏn’gun chipkwŏn’gi p’osam,” 209, 210.  
87 Kojong sillok 5.2.30 (1868). 
88 Palais, Politics and Policy, 173. 
42 
 
taxes, but would be formally prevented from having anything to do with the actual collection of 
taxes.89 
 Ultimately, these reforms were not implemented in the face of bureaucratic difficulties 
and opposition from existing tax collectors within the local government. A later edict reversed 
the initial reforms, and confirming local magistrates’ (kunsu) position at the heart of tax 
assessment and collection.90 The Ministry of Finance still gained some oversight over local 
governments’ financial affairs, as the regulations that restored tax collection to local magistrates 
also granted the Ministry of Finance the right to appoint collectors within the local 
administration (following prior endorsement from the magistrates), to control levels of taxation, 
and to otherwise manage the activities of tax collectors.91 The Ministry of Finance also exercised 
its authority over local government offices to limit spending as part of its efforts to increase the 
proportion of taxes available to the central government.92 But, when it came to the management 
of information over taxes, their assessment and collection, the Ministry entered into something of 
a trade-off with the local governments who were both the target and necessary ally of reform 
efforts.  
 For all the attempts to reform the fiscal system through the Kabo reform and Great 
Korean Empire era, the Ministry of Finance faced several serious limitations. To increase 
revenues from the land tax required the ministry to have accurate knowledge of land conditions. 
To that end, the central government initiated a cadastral survey in 1898 that is frequently credited 
with increasing tax revenues and providing the government requisite information over 
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landownership.93 In other areas, however, the Ministry of Finance struggled to gain information 
and authority over sources of taxation. The administrative structures that consolidated the 
management of maritime customs under a single office that once helped streamline customs 
receipts as a ready source of spending on government projects proved a liability in later years. 
The immense authority granted to the chief commissioner of customs granted MacLeavy Brown 
the opportunity to ignore requests from the Ministry of Finance for information and funds from 
the maritime customs.94 Similarly, when the Imperial Household challenged the Ministry’s right 
to collect certain revenues, the dispute extended beyond the central bureaucracy into the local 
level; rather than rely on local government offices to act on its behalf, the Office of Crown 
Property directly dispatched its own tax assessors and collectors.95 
The colonial effort to reform the Korean tax system followed similar patterns to those 
initiated in the Kabo reforms. In particular, parallels are often drawn between the cadastral 
surveys conducted by the Great Korean Empire and the colonial government. Especially in the 
latter case, many scholars have cited the cadastral surveys as evidence of the state’s modernizing 
agenda that aimed to use scientific methods to rationalize administration and governance within 
Korea.96 Yet, even granting the technological innovations that the colonial cadastral survey 
represented beyond the Kwangmu survey, the colonial government itself was acutely aware that 
effective governance in practice relied upon a much more complex system of administrative 
methods. Just as the preceding governments, the colonial government could only collect taxes by 
working through local government offices. 
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To that end, and in common with the planned Kabo reforms, the long-term goal of 
colonial tax reform required the establishment of an independent system of tax supervisory 
offices. Originally planned under Megata Tanetarō’s 1906 reforms, a separate body of tax 
collection offices was not introduced until 1934, on the introduction of the personal income tax. 
Until that point, and even afterwards in the management of some taxes, taxes continued to be 
handled through the local administrative system, through the unit of the township (myŏn).97 
 From a relatively minor role in the Chosŏn administrative system, the township therefore 
came to fulfil an important position in the composition of the colonial state. As with the new tax 
system instituted during the protectorate period many of the colonial government’s early policies 
assumed the township as a basic administrative unit, eventually formalizing the new form and 
functions of the townships through the township system announced in 1917.98 In this new role, 
the selection of township heads (myŏnjang) received greater scrutiny than in previous years. On 
the one hand, the colonial government actively sought township heads who would be capable of 
fulfilling the bureaucratic work of the newly reinvented office. At the same time, however, the 
colonial government equally recruited township heads on the basis of their local authority in age 
and morals. As far as the township heads occupied a key position at the lowest level of the 
colonial bureaucracy, the abilities of the township heads selected in this manner also served to 
hamper the colonial government’s technocratic ambitions.99  
 This was not at odds with other aspects of colonial administration. Despite the technical 
achievement of the cadastral survey, several aspects of tax collection continued to draw upon 
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alternative practices that lay outside of the formal rationality of the bureaucracy. Throughout 
colonial rule, myriad village organizations blended familiar customs and practices with the 
ambitions of colonial administration, bringing the government’s tax policies well beyond the 
formal boundaries of government offices. From the 1920s onwards, the colonial government 
encouraged the formation of local promotion societies (Ko. chinhŭnghoe; Ja. shinkōkai), within 
which were frequently organized multiple other sub-organizations (often named kye or chohap) 
to encourage saving money for taxes, mutual insurance against the cost of wedding and funerals, 
and jointly purchasing fertilizers. Despite the obvious influence of colonial policies in some of 
the objectives of the groups, the form and practices within each also drew heavily from the prior 
social networks existing within the villages.100  
The colonial government also drew upon local knowledge in the collection of taxes, 
especially the alcohol tax. After the imposition of the alcohol tax, home-brewing was limited by 
permit and eventually outlawed in favor of commercial manufacturers who proved an easier 
target of the tax policy. Nonetheless, illegal home-brewing often occurred, leading local 
government officials and alcohol manufacturers to adopt impromptu methods to catch illegal 
brewers. In examples noted by Itagaki Ryūta, officials relied upon rumors and information 
concerning the date of family chesa ceremonies to honor dead ancestors as a guide to launch 
inspections for illegal home-brewing.101 Here, the colonial state continued to rely upon brokers 
for information and enforcement of taxes, although where the Chosŏn government granted the 
benefits of brokerage to social elites, the colonial tax system favored the interests of corporations 
and commercial brewers. As the conduit of taxation, commercial brewers not only received the 
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sanction of the colonial state, but were could appeal to the colonial tax system to challenge 
competition among home-brewers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By 1945, the Korean fiscal state looked quite different from its late-Chosŏn predecessor. 
Nonetheless, a focus on just the outward differences of each period provides only a superficial 
understanding of the changes to the fiscal system. In enacting reforms, each regime confronted 
the common challenges of information and negotiation. Examining the methods that each regime 
adopted in order to overcome these hurdles presents a fuller picture of the processes of change 
from one regime to the next. Although the full extent of colonial tax collection practices is far 
from clear in the existing research, accounts that overlook the role of local politics and social 
customs in the implementation of colonial policy can only provide a partial understanding of the 
colonial state. 
 This paper has therefore looked for both the continuities and the differences that 
characterized the fiscal system in three periods of government and financial reform. Removed 
from the discourse of modernity and modern origins, the various reforms to Korean state 
finances from the 1860s onwards share more than might be expected. Innovations such as the 
land survey were not a panacea with regard to taxation, and in each period the government 
remained reliant upon loans and grants to balance increased spending with revenues. Despite 
increasing moves toward the centralization of national accounts, interaction between central and 
local government offices remained a key site of information, conflict, and negotiation as each 
regime sought to maximize its revenues. What is more, in pursuit of information, each 
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government relied upon a different set of actors in gathering detailed information and enforcing 
taxation practices. For all the bureaucratic rationality of the colonial system, where tax priorities 
favored some over others the government recreated a version of the local politics surrounding tax 
collection, partnering with new corporate interests over social elites who previously took on 
similar roles.  
 As an initial attempt at reperiodization, this paper is but a first step. The early half of the 
nineteenth century is still poorly represented within accounts of modern Korea, but incorporating 
a broader discussion of the nineteenth century into accounts of modern change can provide many 
fresh insights into modern Korean history. As a time of ecological, economic, and political 
upheaval, the full history of the nineteenth century has much to bear on later reforms, not least 
where reforms attempted to solve the same series of problems stemming from nineteenth-century 
developments. Even though it may be possible to characterize various attributes of the fiscal 
regimes discussed here as “modern” or “premodern,” in looking beyond these labels to highlight 
the functioning of the system, the range of actors that spanned central and local government, and 
the formal and informal mechanisms of taxation, this paper presents the potential of the project 
of reperiodization to stimulate deeper engagement with the nineteenth century and the production 
of alternative narratives that do not rely upon constructions of modernity. Modernity will no 
doubt continue to be an important topic within Korean history, and an interest in reperiodization 
need not preclude a concern for the changing dynamics of Korean society. Rather, the limits of 
modernity must also be considered as historians seek to open new discussions that look beyond 
the boundaries of modern history.  
 
 
